

fore the grant of letters of administration in Baltimore to a citizen of this city, or to have such letters revoked; rights of consul general and his representative not superior to those of such relatives. Courts bound by treaties; construction thereof. *Chryssikos v. Demarco*, 134 Md. 536.

The last sentence of this section applies only in case the intestacy is not notorious, or has not been proven to satisfaction of court. This section construed to harmonize with sec. 15. *Williams v. Addison*, 93 Md. 44; *Jones v. Harbaugh*, 93 Md. 273; *Burgess v. Boswell*, 139 Md. 676; *Dorsey v. Dorsey*, 140 Md. 171. *Cf. Stouffer v. Stouffer*, 110 Md. 373.

The grant of letters is a judgment *in rem*, and does not prove intestacy when a will is offered for probate. Letters may be revoked. *Emmert v. Stouffer*, 64 Md. 551.

When letters granted in point of time as required by this section to a stranger will not be revoked. *Carpenter v. Jones*, 44 Md. 628.

It will be presumed that orphans' court discharged its duty in inquiring into "time and place" of death of deceased; but be this as it may, the matter cannot be inquired into collaterally. *Raborg v. Hammond*, 2 H. & G. 50.

This section referred to in construing sec. 15—see notes thereto. *Grimes v. Talbert*, 14 Md. 172.

This section referred to in construing sec. 33—see notes thereto. *Ehlen v. Ehlen*, 64 Md. 362.

This section referred to in a prosecution for perjury as showing that orphans' court has power to administer an oath. *State v. Mercer*, 101 Md. 540.

Cited but not construed in *Georgetown College v. Browne*, 34 Md. 455.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 17. 1912, sec. 17. 1904, sec. 17. 1888, sec. 17. 1798, ch. 101, sub-ch. 5, sec. 7.

18. The qualifications of an administrator shall in all respects be the same as herein prescribed for an executor, and all questions touching such qualifications shall be tried and determined by the same proofs and in like manner.

This section referred to in deciding that court would apply same rules in matter of time within which an application is made to revoke letters, as in an application for letters. *Edwards v. Bruce*, 8 Md. 396. *Cf. Stocksdales v. Conaway*, 14 Md. 107.

Cited but not construed in *Pollard v. Mohler*, 55 Md. 289; *Georgetown College v. Browne*, 34 Md. 455.

See notes to sec. 56.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 18. 1912, sec. 18. 1904, sec. 18. 1888, sec. 18. 1798, ch. 101, sub-ch. 5, sec. 10. 1898, ch. 331.

19. If the intestate leave a surviving husband or widow, as the case may be, and a child, or children, administration at the discretion of the court shall be granted either to the surviving husband or widow as the case may be, or child, or one of the children.

The "discretion" given the court under this section means that the choice shall be made after considering the relative merits and fitness of applicants and not solely at its pleasure and caprice. *Horton v. Horton*, 157 Md. 127.

Secs. 19-30 referred to in holding that relatives living in Greece of a deceased resident of that country who died in Baltimore were not entitled either to notice before the grant of letters of administration in Baltimore to a citizen of this city, or to have such letters revoked; rights of consul general and his representative not superior to those of such relatives. Courts bound by treaties; construction thereof. *Chryssikos v. Demarco*, 134 Md. 536.

The appellee held under the evidence to be a child of decedent and hence entitled to letters. Person claiming to be an adopted child not entitled since she claimed to have been adopted prior to act of 1892 (art. 16, sec. 78, *et seq.*), which first made provision for legal adoption. *Holritter v. Wagner*, 139 Md. 604.

Where one of a class of persons is entitled there is no priority of right based on seniority. The choice is in discretion of orphans' court, and no appeal lies. *Bowie v. Bowie*, 73 Md. 234; *Kailer v. Kailer*, 92 Md. 149; *Dorsey v. Dorsey*, 140 Md. 170.

Where children are minors, widow is entitled. *Slay v. Beck*, 107 Md. 360.

A temporary absence from the state will not disentitle a daughter to administer. *Owings v. Bates*, 9 Gill, 465.

As to what extent fact that applicant is a debtor, or both a debtor and creditor of estate, will affect discretion vested in court, see *Kailer v. Kailer*, 92 Md. 150; *Owings v. Bates*, 9 Gill, 466; *Dorsey v. Dorsey*, 140 Md. 171.

The fact that a party entitled has no interest in the estate is immaterial. *Williams v. Addison*, 93 Md. 45; *McColgan v. Kenny*, 68 Md. 259.